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NOTES
STANDING FOR PUBLIC AND QUASI-PUBLIC
INTEREST TAX LITIGANTS
If a federal taxpayer's tax liability is adversely affected by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury's interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code,'
either through the issuance of a revenue ruling or a regulation,2 the
taxpayer may challenge the validity of that ruling or regulation through
statutory judicial review.3 The aggrieved taxpayer may either refuse to
pay an alleged deficiency and file a petition in the United States Tax
Court,4 or pay the deficiency and sue for a refund in a federal district
court or the Court of Claims.5 One who does not assert an incorrect
assessment of his own taxes, yet claims to be adversely affected by a
revenue ruling or regulation, must rely on nonstatutory forms of re-
view.6 Such an indirectly affected claimant may seek an injunction,7 a
declaratory judgment, or both.8
1. I.R-C. §§ 1-9042.
2. Id. § 7805.
3. Id. §§ 6213 & 7422.
4. Id. §§ 6214 & 7422.
5. See id. § 7422.
6. See Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1976). See generally 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 23.04-.06 (Supp. 1976); L. JAFFE, JuDICiAL CONTROL OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE AcrIoN 193-94 (1965); Note, Non-Taxpaver Challenges to Internal Revenue Service
Rulemaking: Constitutional and Statutory Barriers to Judicial Review, 63 GEo. L.. 1263, 1273
(1975).
7. Plaintiff must overcome the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a) ("Except as pro-
vided in sections 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 7426(a) and (b)(1), and 7429(b), no suit for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed."). See
Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725 (1974); Educo, Inc. v. Alexander, 557 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1977); Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v.
Shultz, 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974); ITT v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Del. 1975).
8. Plaintiff must also overcome the federal taxes exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with re-
spect to Federal taxes, any Court of the United States... may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. . . ."). For a discussion of the applica-
tion of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, see
Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes & Civil Rights.: "Constitutionalizing the Internal Revenue Code," 82
YALE LJ. 51 (1972); Note, supra note 6.
Washington University Open Scholarship
572 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1978:571
Unlike the taxpayer whose tax liability is in issue,9 the taxpayer who
merely challenges the validity of a ruling or regulation without assert-
hag that the ruling or regulation affects his own tax liability 0 must es-
tablish his standing to sue under section 10(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)."1 This Note traces the cases in which these indi-
rectly affected plaintiffs, asserting either a public interest or a quasi-
public interest, 2 have brought suit against the Secretary of the Treas-
ury claiming the invalidity of a rule or regulation. This culminates in
an analysis of Simon v. Eastern Kentucky We/fare Rights
Organization13 and concludes with predictions for the future of public
and quasi-public interest tax litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code14 is more than a complex, statutory
mechanism enabling the federal government to collect revenues. It has
also been designed' 5 and construed' 6 to implement substantive poll-
9. See text accompanying note 3 suapra.
10. For the purposes of this Note, such plaintiffs will be referred to as "indirectly affected
plaintiffs" and "public and quasi-public interest litigants." See note 12 infra.
11. Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976); see notes 22-25 infra
and accompanying text.
12. The use of the phrase, "quasi-public interest," is borrowed from Tannenbaum, Public
Interest Tax Litigation Challenging Substantive IRS Decisions, 27 NAT'L TAX. J. 373, 374 (1974).
Quasi-public interest suits represent a class of plaintiffs narrower than all federal taxpayers.
However, to the extent that if successful the court ruling "will result in higher federal tax pay-
ments by the limited class of taxpayers whose benefits are reduced or eliminated, and ultimately in
reduced tax payments for the general public," the suit also represents the general public interest.
See generally Zacharias, Standing of Public Interest Litigation Groups to Sue on Behalf of Their
Members, 39 U. PrnT. L. REv. 453 (1978).
13. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See also Note, Constitutional Law--Standing ofIndigents in Need of
Hospital Care to Challenge the Charitable Tax Status of Hospitals, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 247; Com-
ment, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 95, 103 (1976).
14. .LR.C. §§ 1-9042.
15. E.g., The Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 902, 83 Stat. 710-11 (now I.R.C. § 162), explicitly
sanctions business expenses that are contrary to public policy. Such nondeductible expenses in-
clude penalties and fines for violations of the law, I.R.C. §§ 162(0, (g), illegal bribes or kickbacks
to government officials or employees, id. § 162(c)(1), and unethical business payments such as
bribes and protection payments. Id. § 162(c)(3).
16. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the federal courts refused to allow deductions that
encouraged "frustration of sharply defined national or state policies." Tank Truck Rentals v.
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958). See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27
(1958); Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v.
United States, 315 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963); Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954);
Benjamin T. Smith, 34 T.C. 1100 (1960), affdper curiam, 294 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1961); Luther M.
Richey, Jr., 33 T.C. 272 (1959); Leon Turrispeed, 27 T.C. 758 (1957); Ellett & Rubinstein, Disal-
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ties17 wholly unrelated to the collection of revenues. The Code en-
courages activities that Congress has determined to be beneficial"8 and
discourages conduct deemed contrary to public policy. 19 Implementa-
tion of the Code, therefore, affects taxpayers both directly, through the
payment of tax dollars, and indirectly, as beneficiaries2 ° of the activities
that Congress intended to encourage or discourage. Thus, public and
quasi-public interest plaintiffs have sought relief from the courts alleg-
ing that the Secretary of the Treasury's interpretation of the Code was
contrary to congressional intent that the Code be construed conso-
nantly with public policy.21
Public and quasi-public interest tax litigants must seek nonstatutory
review. 22 Plaintiffs seeking nonstatutory review of administrative ac-
tions, whether a Treasury ruling or any other agency action, must sat-
isfy the standing test set forth in section 10(a) of the APA.2 3  This
section provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."'24 Although the same test applies to all nonstatutory review
plaintiffs, courts are more reluctant to grant standing to public and
lowed Deductions: 1969 Tax Reform Act Changes to Code Section 162, 48 TAXES 457, 457 n.1
(1970); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on Deductions from Gross Income: A Conceptual
Analysis, 43 IND. LJ. 406, 414 n.45 (1968); Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments
and Recoveries, 25 TAx. L. REv. 611, 613 n.2 (1970); Note, The Judicial Public Policy Doctrine in
Tax Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 131, 131 (1975).
17. S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFoRM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 126-74,
324-42 (1973).
18. See, eg., 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1976) (providing a deduction for charitable contributions); 26
U.S.C. § 501 (1976) (exempting from federal taxation several kinds of organizations such as corpo-
rations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes).
19. See note 15 supra.
20. Whether public and quasi-public interest plaintiffs are intended beneficiaries of Code
provisions is an important factor in the standing analysis that follows. See notes 96-104 infra and
accompanying text.
21. See, eg., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'dsub nom. Tax Analysts & Advocates v.
Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889
(D.D.C. 1974); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affldsub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); cf. Note, supra note
16, at 131 (general discussion of the public policy tax doctrine).
22. See Note, supra note 6, at 1263. See generally Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1009
(1975); Nader v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976); cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) (§ 10(a) of the APA "grants standing to a person 'aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute' ").
24. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
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quasi-public interest tax litigants because of "the established doctrine
that in assessing and collecting taxes and utilizing predictable revenue
gathering procedures, the government must be free from premature ju-
dicial interference."25
II. STANDING BEFORE ESTEJIW KENrUCKY
Green v. Connally26 was the first quasi-public interest suit brought
against the Secretary of the Treasury. Plaintiffs, black parents of
school children attending public schools in Mississippi, sought to en-
join the Secretary from affording tax-exempt status and allowing the
charitable deduction of contributions to private schools that discrimi-
nated against black students. The court, without mentioning plaintiffs'
standing, found the indirect support provided by exemptions and de-
ductions indistinguishable, in a constitutional sense, from direct gov-
ernment grants27 and issued an injunction. In support of its assertion
that the public policy limitation applies to the charitable provisions of
the Code,28 the court looked to cases that had held the "Code must be
construed and applied in consonance with the Federal public policy
,29
25. Note, supra note 6, at 1264-74. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974);
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1962); Bull v. United States, 295
U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1883); State R.R. Tax Cases, 92
U.S. 575, 613-14 (1875); Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1875); Dows v. City of
Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1870); Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 504 F.2d 462
(10th Cir. 1974).
Congress may also be more reluctant to grant standing to public and quasi-public interest tax
litigants. Legislation has been proposed which would remove the strictures of Eastern Kentucky
from the federal courts' standing requirements. The proposed bill, however, provides that it
"shall not affect the standing or lack of standing of persons to challenge agency action which
affects the liability or status of another person under the revenue laws." S. 3005; 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. Rac. S. 6498.99 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978). See note 91 infra.
26. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'dub nor. Coit v.Green, 464 U.S. 997 (1971).
27. Clearly the Federal Government could not under the Constitution give direct
financial aid to schools practicing racial discrimination. But tax exemptions and deduc-
tions certainly constitute a Federal Government benefit and support. While that sup-
port is indirect, and is in the nature of a matching grant rather than an unconditional
grant, it would be difficult indeed to establish that such support can be provided consist-
ently with the Constitution.
Id. at 1164-65. "But governmental and constitutional interest of avoiding racial discrimination in
educational institutions embraces the interest of avoiding even the 'indirect economic benefit' of a
tax exemption." Id. at 1169; Sf Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1969) (first amendment
implications of providing tax exemptions to religious organizations and allowing deductions for
contributions to such organizations).
28. I.R.C. §§ 170 & 501.
29. 330 F. Supp. at 1163-64. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Tank Truck
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/5
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In McGlotten v. Connally,30 another quasi-public interest tax suit,
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretary from granting tax benefits to
fraternal and nonprofit organizations that discriminated against non-
whites. Unlike the court in Green, however, the McGlotten court re-
quired plaintiffs to establish their standing to sue by satisfying the two-
pronged test set forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organi-
zations v. Camp3" and Barlow v. Collins.32 Under this test, to satisfy
the case or controversy requirement of Article 111,33 plaintiff must es-
tablish "that the challenged action has caused injury in fact, economic
or otherwise" and that "the interest sought to be protected . . . is ar-
guably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 34
The plaintiffs in McGlotten claimed they were injured by the grant of
tax benefits because it enabled the maintenance of the organizations'
discriminatory policies and constituted "an endorsement of blatantly
discriminatory organizations by the Federal Government. 35 Without
any data about the organizations' financial dependency on the chal-
lenged tax deductions, the court found it sufficient that "the Govern-
ment has indicated approval of. . .their discriminatory practice, and
aided that discrimination by the provision of federal tax benefits. 36
Although the Supreme Court in Eastern Kentucky later would re-
quire plaintiffs to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood" that the IRS
ruling caused the alleged injury,37 the court in McGlotten summarily
found causation without examining any facts upon which it could base
a causal nexus inquiry. Without regard to the size of the organization,
its membership, its financial resources, or the nature of its facili-
ties-factors which determine the impact of the disallowance of exemp-
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958);
Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
30. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
31. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
32. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 1.
34. 397 U.S. at 153; see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. at 164. For a more extensive discussion
of standing, see 3 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TR.ATISE § 27.00 (1970 & Supp. 1976); Davis,
Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 69 (1977); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CH.
L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARv. L. REv. 633 (1971); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A FunctonalAnalysis, 86 HAv. L. REv. 645 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1723-47 (1975).
35. 338 F. Supp. at 452.
36. Id. at 459.
37. 426 U.S. at 35. See text accompanying notes 74-83 infra.
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tions and deductions-the McGlotten court concluded that the granting
of tax benefits constituted federal support or encouragement.38 The
court assumed that "[e]very deduction ... , provides a benefit" 3 9 and
"the withdrawal of that benefit would often act as a substantial incen-
tive to eliminate the behavior which caused the change in status. '40
Thus the organization's true financial dependency on federal benefits
was immaterial to the court's grant of standing.41
After McGlotten one could argue that where the injury is govern-
mental support and encouragement of a violation of constitutionally
protected rights, it is sufficient to allege that the agency action encour-
ages private persons or institutions to violate plaintiffs' constitutional
rights. Under this theory, plaintiffs do not suffer injury from the effects
of the agency action on the policies of private organizations, but rather
from the agency action, which stamps the imprimatur of approval on
discriminatory policies. Thus plaintiffs need not demonstrate the ac-
tual effect of the governmental action on private entities' behavior.42
38. 338 F. Supp. at 456. See Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 8, at 62; Note, supra note 16, at
140.
39. 338 F. Supp. at 456. For a discussion of whether deductions and exemptions are "bene-
fits" provided by the federal government, see McDaniel, Federal Matching Grantsfor Charitable
Contributions: .A Substitutefor the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAx L. Rav. 377 (1972); Surrey,
Federal Income Tax Reforms: The VariedApproaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expendiures wth
Direct Government Assstance, 84 HARv. L. REy. 352 (1970); Stone, Federal Tax Supports of Char.
ties and Other Exempt Organizations: The Needfor a National Policy, 20 So. CAL. TAX INST. 27
(1968); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy.A Comparison with
Direct Governmental Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 705 (1970).
40. 338 F. Supp. at 456.
41. See Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 8, at 60-62.
42. In the context of racial discrimination this result is appropriate. See Trafficante v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); 51 N.C.L. Rnv. 1530 (1973); 40 TENN. L. REv. 502
(1973). The Supreme Court has relaxed standing requirements where governmental action has a
chilling effect on fundamental rights. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Lamond v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964). See also Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64 (Ist Cir. 1975).
Moreover, although some cases have held that only black citizens who have suffered wrong
from alleged discriminatory practices have standing to sue, see Brown v. Lutz, 316 F. Supp. 1096
(E.D. La. 1970); Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), the better view is
that any citizen, regardless of race, should be able to challenge governmental action that may
induce private persons to relegate blacks to second class citizenship. See Trafficante v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Coleman v.
Aycock, 304 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F.
Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and411 That:-A BehavioralAnalysls,
25 VA1ND. L. Ray. 479, 500 (1972). Indeed, Professor Sedler argues that plaintiffs' injury in fact is
the government action itself that contributes to "the institutional racism that is so much a part of
the American scene." Id.
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Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz4 3 supports the proposition that
when fundamental, constitutionally protected rights are at stake,
agency action should be more susceptible to public and quasi-public
interest litigation. Plaintiffs challenged a revenue ruling" that allowed
multiple gifts of up to three thousand dollars to be given in support of
political candidates without subjecting the donor to gift taxation.45
Because the ruling treated the committee and not the political candi-
date as the donee, a donor could give three thousand dollars multiplied
by the number of his candidate's committees without incurring gift tax
liability. The plaintiffs alleged diminution of their vote and dilution of
their ability to affect the electoral process.46
Notwithstanding the "attenuated line of causation between the alleg-
edly illegal conduct and the complained of injury,"'4 7 the court found
the causal link less strained than that found persuasive in United States
v. SCRAP.48 The Supreme Court, in SCRAP, upheld the standing of
an environmental group to assert that a railroad freight rate increase
would increase the cost of recycling, thereby increasing the consump-
tion of nonrecyclable products, requiring the consumption of more nat-
ural resources, some of which would be taken from areas near
plaintiffs' residence, and resulting in the deposit of more refuse in
nearby parks.49 The choice of comparison to this most liberal interpre-
tation of the standing doctrine ° assured plaintiffs' standing in Shultz.
Shultz bears a marked similarity to McGlotten. Plaintiffs were not
required to demonstrate the facts and circumstances that would indi-
cate the probable effect of a change in tax status; they were able to
challenge the revenue ruling without demonstrating that donors had
taken advantage of the ruling and that its revocation would cause do-
nors to give fewer gifts because of the impact of the gift tax. Those
persons whose tax assessment would be directly affected by revocation
of the ruling might decide to continue giving gifts in equal amounts for
43. 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974).
44. Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532.
45. See I.R.C. § 2503.
46. 376 F. Supp. at 898. See also Common Cause v. Shultz, 1973 FED. TAXES (P-H) § 9592
(plaintiffs granted standing to challenge Treasury regulations prescribing the way taxpayers desig-
nate one dollar of their tax liability to be paid to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund).
47. 376 F. Supp. at 897.
48. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
49. Id. at 688.
50. See K. DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATrvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-2 (1976) (supplementing
K. DAVIS, ADmwisTRATVB LAW TREATISE (1970)).
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the benefit of the same candidate. Thus, where, as here, fundamental
or constitutionally protected rights are at stake, plaintiffs need allege
only agency action that acts as an incentive to persons or organizations
to diminish, dilute, or violate those rights. The governmental support
or encouragement is the injury in fact.
When public and quasi-public interest plaintiffs do not allege an in-
jury to constitutionally protected rights, the courts have used the stand-
ing doctrine to bar suits against the Secretary of the Treasury. In Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. Simon,"' plaintiffs, owners of a working inter-
est in a domestic oil well, sought a declaratory judgment that revenue
rulings,-2 which allowed tax credits for income taxes paid to foreign
countries by American citizens and corporations in connection with the
extraction and production of oil, were contrary to the Internal Revenue
Code.53 Plaintiffs claimed injury in their capacity as federal taxpayers
on the theory that they were required to bear a heavier tax burden be-
cause of the decrease in federal revenues resulting from the tax cred-
its.54 In their capacity as competitors, plaintiffs asserted that they
would receive lower prices for their oil because foreign competitors tak-
ing advantage of the tax credit would depress the domestic oil market.
Furthermore, as a result of the depression of the domestic oil market
caused by the tax credit, the value of plaintiffs' interests in their domes-
tic oil well would also decline.55
In denying standing to plaintiffs in their capacity as federal taxpay-
ers,5 6 the court merely followed well-settled principles enunciated by
the Supreme Court. 7 Among several factors contributing to their de-
51. 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975), aft'dsub norm. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal,
566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally 23 VILL. L. REv. 580 (1978). The D.C. Circuit
decided the case after Eastern Kentucky. With respect to the issues discussed at this point, the
D.C. Circuit expressly affirmed the district court. In dealing with issues discussed later in the
Note, however, the circuit court misconstrued Justice Powell's decision in Eastern Kentucky. See
American Soe'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 149-50 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
id. at 155 n.23 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting). Thus for purposes of clarity and consistency, the dis-
trict court opinion is discussed.
52. Rev. RuL 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306; Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386.
53. I.R.C. §§ 901(b) & 903.
54. 390 F. Supp. at 931.
55. Id. at 931, 938.
56. Id. at 932.
57. The court rejected plaintiffs' taxpayer standing on the basis of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968) and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Frothingham Court ruled that a
federal taxpayer, as such, is without standing to challenge the constitutionality ofa federal statute.
392 U.S. at 85. The Hast exception to Frothingham is a narrow one, requiring at least a constitu-
tional challenge. It is applicable only where the taxpayer can
demonstrate a logical link between his status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislative
[Vol. 1978:571
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nial of plaintiffs' standing as competitors,58 the court applied an overly
strict zone of interests test.59 In nontax cases, courts generally have
been quite liberal in granting standing to plaintiffs who challenge gov-
ernmental action that benefits a competitor" or decreases the value of
enactment, Ze. an attack on an enactment under the taxing and spending clause of the
Constitution (Art. 1, § 8); and, second, a nexus between the plaintiffs status as a taxpayer
and a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power.
390 F. Supp. at 934. Since plaintiffs merely alleged an unauthorized administrative ruling result-
ing in a heavier tax burden, the court found the taxpayers outside the Nast exception. Id. at 935-
36.
58. The court found that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to establish injury in
fact, that plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests created by the statute, and that "policy
considerations" militated against a grant of standing. 390 F. Supp. at 941-42.
59. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (Comptroller of the Currency
authorized banks to operate collective investment funds in competition with open-end investment
companies); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (Comptroller of the Currency ruling
that banks, incidental to their banking services, may provide travel services, challenged by a group
of travel agencies); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970)
(Comptroller of the Currency authorized banks to "make data processing services available to
other banks and to bank customers" in competition with companies that "sell data processing
services to businesses generally"); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (Tennessee
Valley Authority authorized to supply power at rates less than half those of an established private
utility company); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) (The Chicago
Junction Case) (Interstate Commerce Commission authorized acquisition of two terminal rail-
roads by larger railroad company in direct competition with other local railroad companies);
Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Federal Aviation Administration
accepted offer of lowest bidder on a contract for installation of instrument landing systems al-
though the bidder had not complied with qualifications for bidders contained in the bid invitation,
whereas second lowest bidder had complied); Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (Interior Department promulgated regulation requiring government agencies and their
contractors to purchase helium requirements only from government or certain "eligible" private
suppliers, thus prohibiting purchases from all other private suppliers); Marine Space Enclosures,
Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (New York City gave Port of
New York Authority a contract for construction and maintenance of maritime passenger terminal
facilities in port of New York City under restrictive covenants, which excluded other developers
for more than seventy years from operating different kinds of terminals); Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d
972 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (Federal Maritime Administrator and Mari-
time Subsidy Board failed to recover subsidies paid to a shipping company found by the Federal
Maritime Commission to be cutting rates to drive competition out of business); Public Serv. Co. v.
Hamil, 416 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1070 (1970) (Indiana's Rural Electrifi-
cation Administrator granted a loan commitment to an electric cooperative without the approval
of the Indiana Public Service Commission and contrary to the interests of an electric company
already servicing the area involved); Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 405
F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968) (Federal Maritime Commission approved a merger or consolidation
agreement between three steamship lines in direct competition with another company doing busi-
ness in that area); Mid-West Nat'1 Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 296 F. Supp. 1223, 1226
(N.D. Ill. 1968) (Comptroller of the Currency approved a national bank's application to establish
detached drive-in banking facilities in a location of questionable validity under a state law regu-
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their investments.61 The Tax Analysts court could have followed this
liberal standing policy by considering the Code in its entirety and its
general policy to tax persons in equivalent economic situations
equally 62 as creating a protected zone of interests.63  The court, how-
ever, fearing a flood of suits against the Secretary of the Treasury,"
found the general equitable goals of the Internal Revenue Code too
vague and uncodified to be construed as creating a protected zone of
lating the location of such facilities, the approval of which would subject another national bank to
"potential competitive harm"); Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp. 589, 593 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (Ala-
bama State Board of Pharmacy was authorized by state law to issue "assistant pharmacist certifi-
cates" to persons with at least fifteen successive years in pharmacy under the supervision of a
licensed pharmacist; the certificates granted status and rights equivalent to those of licensed phar-
macists, but required less burdensome qualifications).
61. See, eg., The Bootery, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 326 F. Supp.
794 (D.D.C. 1971) (Transit Authority gave affected business operators an inadequate opportunity
to address the Authority on a mass transit plan); L'Enfant Plaza N., Inc. v. District of Columbia
Dev. Land Agency, 300 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1969) (agency grant of permission to property devel-
oper to build a cafeteria, drug store, bank, post office, and savings and loan building, even though
the urban renewal plan for the area limited construction to offices and "accessory uses such as
employee restaurants and off-street parking," upheld in suit to enjoin the construction by owners
of neighboring property).
62. W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 5-8 (1976).
63. The court noted that the purpose behind the passage of §§ 901(b) and 903, the Code
sections upon which the challenged revenue rulings were based, was the prevention of double
taxation. 390 F. Supp. at 340, 342 (citing Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932)).
This, however, should not preclude, as the court implied, a finding that Congress also intended to
equalize the tax burden between foreign and domestic competitors, see note 62 supra, thus bring-
ing plaintiffs within the protected zone of interests. In light of the multiple purposes served by the
Code, see notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text, one can hardly argue that each provision
serves only one purpose or interest.
64. 390 F. Supp. at 942. The court also expressed its concern that the case might present a
political question:
The revenue rulings at issue here are Executive Branch decisions which have particular
relevance today to the conduct of foreign affairs by this country. These rulings do not
simply interpret Code provisions which have only internal ramifications. Rather they
are responses to the acts of sovereign nations with whom the United States is at present
engaged in a delicate relationship. The courts' lack of expertise in foreign affairs has led
to a longstanding deference to the Executive Branch in such matters and that deference
is an appropriate policy for consideration in the instant suit, although not controlling
since the Court has found that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this suit.
Id. It is impossible to determine how much the court's decision to deny standing was influenced
by the existence and magnitude of the lurking political question. One would expect, however,
that in 1975 the court would entertain vivid memories of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo. See
generally A. BLAuSTEIN & J. PAUST, THE ARAB On. WEAPON (1977); E. Copp, REoULATINo
COMPETITION IN OIL (1976); D. DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS (1974); R. HARNISH & M.
WEIDENBAUM, GOVERNMENT CREDIT SUBsIDIES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (1976); R.
MANCKE, THE FAILURE OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY (1974); THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, POLITICS, AND
DEVELOPMENT (J. Anthony ed. 1975).
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interests.65
Prior to Eastern Kentucky, most courts found standing in public and
quasi-public interest tax suits where plaintiffs alleged an injury to con-
stitutionally protected rights and denied standing where plaintiffs did
not allege such injury.
III. WARTH V. SELDIN AND ITS APPLICATION IN EASTERN KENTUCKY
In Warth v. Seldin,66 the Supreme Court enunciated the standing
principles, later applied in Eastern Kentucky,67 which remain the major
obstacles to public and quasi-public interest tax litigants. One of four
distinct groups of plaintiffs, persons of low and moderate income68 al-
leged they were effectively excluded from residing in Penfield, New
York because of the town's restrictive zoning ordinances. The Court
found that plaintiffs' claims that they desired to live in the town and
made some efforts to locate housing did not establish "in any con-
cretely demonstrable way" 69 that plaintiffs' inability to locate housing
resulted from defendants' restrictive zoning practices. 70  Moreover, the
Court held that plaintiffs must demonstrate to a "substantial prob-
ability""1 that exercise of the Court's remedial powers would vindicate
plaintiffs' alleged injury. Plaintiffs' ability to locate low and moderate
income housing depended upon the willingness of third parties to build
such housing. 2 Because they failed to demonstrate to a substantial
probability that third parties would build suitably priced housing if the
Court enjoined defendants' restrictive zoning ordinances, plaintiffs
were denied standing.7"
Although the Court recognized that the indirectness of the relation-
65. 390 F. Supp. at 937.
66. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
67. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See notes 75-84 infra and accompanying text.
68. For purposes of clarity, this Note will only discuss the Court's standing analysis with
respect to the low and moderate income plaintiffs who sought housing in Penfield. For a more
complete discussion of this rather complicated case, see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89
HARv. L. Ruv. 1, 189-95 (1975); Note, Warth v. Seldin: The Substantial Probability Test, 3 HAST.
CONST. LQ. 485 (1977).
69. 422 U.S. at 504.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1974).
73. 422 U.S. at 504. Accord, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) (on facts similar to Warth, standing was granted because one of the plaintiffs, a builder,
entered into a lease and a sole agreement for land on which he intended to build a low rent
apartment complex).
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ship between the alleged wrong and the alleged injury does not neces-
sarily preclude standing, it candidly admitted that "it may make it
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art.
III: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence
of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the
harm."'74
In Eastern Kentucky, plaintiffs sought revocation of a revenue rul-
ing75 that allowed hospitals that did not offer services to indigents, "to
the extent of their financial ability, ' 76 to qualify as charitable organiza-
tions. Plaintiffs, indigents who sought and were refused medical care
in local hospitals, alleged that the ruling injured them because it en-
couraged the hospitals to deny services to indigents."7 They further
contended that as intended beneficiaries of the Code provisions that
grant favorable tax treatment to charitable organizations, 7 they had
standing to assert that the Secretary of the Treasury had acted contrary
to Congress' intent.
The Court assumed for purposes of the standing inquiry "that the
IRS's new policy encourages a hospital to provide fewer services to in-
digents, ' 79 but concluded that this did not imply that a court-ordered
revocation of the ruling "would result in the plaintiffs receiving the
hospital services they desire[d]." s The Court then noted that "[i]t is
purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the com-
plaint fairly can be traced to defendant's 'encouragement' or instead
result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax
implications."81
In an attempt to demonstrate that revocation of the ruling would re-
dress their injury, plaintiffs introduced affidavits indicating that some
hospitals received substantial charitable contributions. The Solicitor
General asserted that on a nationwide basis, however, charitable con-
tributions accounted for only four percent of private hospital revenues.
74. 422 U.S. at 505.
75. Plaintiffs challenged Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 177, which allowed nonprofit hospi-
tals to maintain their tax exempt status even though nonemergency indigent patients were re-
ferred to other hospitals in the community. This ruling modified Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1. C.B.
202, which required that for a hospital to be tax exempt, it must, to the extent of its financial
ability, serve indigents.
76. 426 U.S. at 31.
77. Id. at 34.
78. Id. See note 96 infra and accompanying text.
79. 426 U.S. at 42 n.23.
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id. at 42-43.
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Thus the Court concluded "that the dependence upon special tax bene-
fits may vary from hospital to hospital" 2 and that notwithstanding rev-
ocation of the ruling there was a substantial likelihood that the
hospitals where plaintiffs sought treatment would continue to elect to
deny nonemergency treatment to indigents. The Court, relying on
Warth to deny standing, said it was unlikely "that victory in this suit
would result in [plaintiffs] receiving the hospital treatment they
desire. "83
Although Eastern Kentucky's substantial likelihood test appeared to
close the door to public and quasi-public interest tax litigants, the
Court specifically left open the question whether one whose tax liability
is not at stake may ever challenge the validity of a ruling or regula-
tion.84 Indeed, the cases following Eastern Kentucky indicate that the
door has been left ajar to at least some third party tax litigants.
IV. STANDING AFTER EASTERN KENTUCKY
Following Eastern Kentucky, most federal courts have required
plaintiffs to allege a particularized injury that concretely and demon-
strably resulted from defendant's action and that will likely be re-
dressed by the remedy sought.85 Although courts uniformly cite
Eastern Kentucky for the proposition that before a court will exercise
jurisdiction plaintiff must demonstrate to a substantial likelihood that
82. Id. at 43.
83. Id. at 45-46.
84. Id. at 37. But see id. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot now imagine a case, at
least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected
ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else.").
85. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Banks v. Multi-Family Mgt., Inc., 554 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 820 (1977); National Ass'n of Neighborhood Health Centers,
Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Ellis v. HUD, 551 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1977); Mul-
queeny v. National Comm. on the Observance of Int'l Women's Year 1975, 549 F.2d 1115 (7th
Cir. 1977); Rental Hous. Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1977); Grey v.
Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura,
544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976); Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976); Jaimes v. Toledo
Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 432 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Sigma Delta Chi v. Martin, 431 F.
Supp. 1182 (D. S.C.), rev'd, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1027 (1978); AMA
v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. 11. 1977); Hoffman v. DiFalco, 424 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, 422 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1976); Melanson v. Rantoul,
421 F. Supp. 492 (D.R.I. 1976); British Columbian Inv. Co. v. FDIC, 420 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D. Cal.
1976); National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1976).
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the relief sought will redress the injury suffered,16 one court held that
Eastern Kentucky dealt with prudential considerations rather than con-
stitutional limitations,87 and another cited it for the proposition that
courts may not exercise jurisdiction over moot controversies. 8
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies reflected in the lower courts' ap-
plication of Eastern Kentucky, these cases and Justice Brennan's dis-
sent89 indicate that federal courts can avoid its strictures by defining
plaintiffs' injury as the governmental encouragement of a violation' of
constitutional rights90 or statutory rights or benefits.91 Inquiry into
the causal nexus between the agency action and the actions of third
parties is then irrelevant because the plaintiff has not asserted that the
latter was the cause of his injury. Plaintiffs' injury is caused directly by
the IRS ruling that misconstrues the Code; therefore the court need not
speculate about the potential responses of the regulated entities92 whose
86. See cases cited in note 85 supra.
87. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see note 51
supra.
88. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976).
89. 426 U.S. at 55-56 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting); see text
accompanying notes 96-104 infra.
90. See discussion of Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974)
and MeGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), in notes 30-50 supra and accompa-
nying text.
91. See notes 96-104 infra and accompanying text. Congress is presently considering legisla-
tion that would remove causation and redressability from the federal courts' standing require-
ments. See S. 3005, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S. 6498-99 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978).
The proposed bill, however, erroneously interpreted Eastern Kentucky as resting upon prudential
considerations, rather than Article III requirements. See 124 CONG. REC. S. 6497 (daily ed. Apr.
27, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum). Although Congress has the power to remove prudential
limitations, it cannot remove considerations of constitutional dimension. See 426 U.S. at 64
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
Eastern Kentucky, however, rests "squarely on the irreducible Article III minimum of injury in
fact, thereby effectively placing it beyond congressional power to rectify." Id See American
Soe'y of Travel Agents v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 149-50 n.2 (1977). Accordingly, Congress
lacks the power to remove the strictures of Eastern Kentucky from the federal courts' standing
requirements.
The proposed bill, however, may be an attempt to persuade the courts to narrowly interpret
Eastern Kentucky. The courts may be persuaded to require a less stringent demonstration of the
causal nexus inquiry than Eastern Kentucky appeared to mandate. See notes 135-40 infra and
accompanying text. Until the proposed bill becomes law, one can only speculate on its impact.
92. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Bazelon, CJ., dissenting); American Soe'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145,
159 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
The phrase "regulated entity" refers to the person or institution to whom the agency action is
directed. In the context of tax litigation, it is the entity whose tax liability is at stake. For exam-
ple, in Eastern Kentucky it is the hospitals; in McGlotten v. Connally, the fraternal organizations.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss3/5
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tax liability will be affected by the relief sought.
Plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky were denied standing because the
Court construed their injury too narrowly, Le., as the refusal of hospi-
tals to supply medical care to indigents.93 Because plaintiffs' injury
was the loss of a benefit supplied by the regulated entity,94 the Court
required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the IRS rulings caused the hos-
pitals to deny them medical care.95
Had the Court interpreted plaintiffs' claim as one of injury to their
congressionally conferred beneficial interest,96 plaintiffs would not
have had to show the likelihood of hospitals admitting indigents in re-
sponse to revocation of the ruling.97 As beneficiaries of these Code
provisions, plaintiffs would have standing to challenge the revenue rul-
ing as contrary to the intent of Congress that economic inducements to
serve indigents be required for hospitals receiving favorable tax treat-
ment. The Court could have interpreted plaintiffs' injury not as their
inability to receive medical care, but rather as their reduced opportu-
nity to receive medical care. The latter was caused by the ruling, which
eliminated an inducement to hospitals to serve indigents. Thus, while
the relief sought may not ensure their admittance to hospitals, it would
restore the inducements to hospitals to admit indigents98 and thereby,
at least theoretically, increase their opportunity to receive medical
services.
By adopting this approach, the Court would satisfy the basic stand-
ing requirement9 9 underlying Article III."°  As intended benefi-
ciaries1 0' of the charitable provisions of the Code, plaintiffs are persons
93. 426 U.S. at 40-41. See notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 92 supra.
95. 426 U.S. at 42-46. See notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text.
96. Plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the charitable provisions of the Code. See East-
ern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 330-33 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); McGlotten v. Connally, 338
F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972); accord, Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d 405 (5th
Cr. 1942); Intercity Hosp. Ass'n v. Squire, 56 F. Supp. 472 (D. Wash. 1944); Sonora Community
Hosp., 56 T.C. 519, 525 (1966); Lorraine Ave.Clinic, 31 T.C. 141 (1958); Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1
C.B. 202.
97. 426 U.S. at 55-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting). See Tushnet, The
New Law of Standing: 4 Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 683 (1977).
98. 426 U.S. at 55-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
99. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
101. See note 96 supra.
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eligible for statutory benefits °2 who have "such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination . ". 1 If it then denied standing,
the Court would be holding sub silentio that the Code does not require
the IRS to offer hospitals economic inducements to serve indigents in
order to qualify for beneficial tax treatment.104
Thus, one method of avoiding Eastern Kentucky is to define the in-
jury as the loss of a statutory right or benefit caused by the implementa-
tion of the IRS ruling which encourages the violation of plaintiffs'
congressionally conferred beneficial interest. This definition avoids
the difficulty of establishing a causal nexus between the IRS action and
private action. Plaintiffs who allege that the agency ruling encourages
a violation of their constitutional rights can use the same approach to
establish their standing.
In McGlotten v. Connally,105 the IRS policy of granting favorable tax
treatment to fraternal organizations that discriminated against blacks
was held to constitute encouragement of racial discrimination.c 6 Be-
cause government encouragement of racial discrimination legitimized
the discriminatory practices, plaintiffs sought to redress this unlawful
legitimization.107 By so defining their injury, it was irrelevant that the
fraternal organizations might, upon revocation of the revenue ruling,
continue to discriminate against blacks and forego their favorable tax
treatment.
Although federal courts may adopt Brennan's suggested approach
where the IRS ruling encourages the violation of constitutionally pro-
tectedrights,108 it is unclear whether they will do so where the alleged
injury is the governmental encouragement of a violation of statutory
rights or benefits. The cases following Eastern Kentucky indicate that
at least some courts are avoiding its barrier in statutory nontax cases by
102. See Alexander v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737 (1st Cir.
1970); Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sparrow v. Gill, 304
F. Supp. 86 (M.D.N.C. 1969); Essex County Welfare Bd. v. Cohen, 299 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.J.
1969); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1974); Sedler, supra note 42.
103. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
104. See Tushnet, supra note 97, at 683.
105. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). See notes 30-41 supra and accompanying text.
106. See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
107. 338 F. Supp. at 452.
108. See note 42 supra But see Melanson v. Rantoul, 421 F. Supp. 492, 503 (D.R.I. 1976).
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adopting this approach sub silentio.1°9
In these cases, courts focus on the agency's interpretation of the stat-
ute, rather than on the nexus between the ruling and the actions of the
regulated entity.11 They construe the statutes as granting plaintiffs a
right 11 or as making them the intended beneficiaries of the statute.112
Injury in fact is then broadly defined as the loss of a right or benefit
conferred by Congress. The agency's unlawful interpretation of the
statute is the direct cause of the loss. Thus regardless of the ruling's
impact on the actions of the regulated entity, plaintiffs have standing to
challenge the ruling because it adversely affects a right or benefit con-
ferred by Congress.
In National Association of Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v.
Mathews,"3 for example, plaintiffs alleged that the Department of
Health Education and Welfare (HEW) violated the Hill-Burton Act.' 1 4
The Act, which authorized federal funding for state construction and
modernization of medical facilities, directed HEW to prescribe regula-
tions under which states would determine priority areas.115 Plaintiffs
109. See, eg., Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs alleged financial injury
from the failure of agency to recover improperly paid subsidies); National Ass'n of Neighborhood
Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (plaintiffs alleged failure to receive
federal funding because HEW regulation violated the Hill-Burton Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 291-91o-1
(1976)); Ellis v. HUD, 551 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs alleged rent increase caused by agency
raising rent ceiling); Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 1325 (M.D. Ala.
1977) (plaintiffs alleged HEW regulations set reimbursement ceilings too low); AMA v. Mathews,
429 F. Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (plaintiff alleged HEW regulations interfered with physicians'
professional judgment).
110. See Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Ass'n of Neighborhood
Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321,329 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Ellis v. HUD, 551 F.2d 13, 16
(3d Cir. 1977); Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 1325, 1328-29 (M.D. Ala.
1977); AMA v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1189-91 (N.D. IM. 1977).
111. See Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 1325, 1328-29 (M.D. Ala.
1977) (Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13.96a(a)(13)(E) (1976), granted nursing homes the right to
have their Medicaid payments determined on a cost-related basis); AMA v. Mathews, 429 F.
Supp. 1179, 1189-90 (N.D. IlM. 1977) (Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976),
granted physicians the right to be free of federal supervision or control of their medical practices).
112. See Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Merchant Marine Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1227 (1976)) allowed shareholders in a steamship company to demand that the Maritime Subsidy
Board, Maritime Administrator, and Secretary of Commerce recover subsidies paid to potential
competitors of the shareholder's company); National Ass'n of Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc.
v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 321, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-91o-I (1976),
allowed health centers to challenge HEW cut-off and restriction of funding for their health serv-
ices); Ellis v. HUD, 551 F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir. 1977) (National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715K
(1976), protects tenants of buildings erected under programs designed to eliminate slums).
113. 551 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-1 (1970).
115. Id. § 291c.
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alleged that HEW violated the Act by approving priority areas drawn
on political lines, without regard to need for the delivery of health serv-
ices," 6 and by illegally transferring funds from one restricted category
to another." 17 The court avoided the Eastern Kentucky inquiry into the
causal nexus between the HEW regulations and the states' allotment of
funds by broadly defining plaintiffs' injuries"' as a disadvantage in the
"priority of funding"' "9 and the "sharp curtailment of their opportuni-
ties for funding."' 2 Inquiry into the likelihood of plaintiffs actually
receiving more funds from the states was, therefore, unnecessary.
As beneficiaries of the Act,' 2' plaintiffs had standing to challenge
HEW regulations that reduced their opportunity for funding. Al-
though the remedy may not assure plaintiffs of funding, it will restore
their rights to the priority and opportunity for funds that Congress in-
tended. The relief sought will redress plaintiffs injury; therefore they
satisfied the Eastern Kentucky standing test.
Although some courts are willing to avoid Eastern Kentucky in non-
tax settings by defining injury as the agency's implementation of a rul-
ing that encourages the violation of statutory rights or benefits, the
question still remains whether courts will allow public and quasi-public
interest tax litigants to challenge IRS rulings on this basis. Judge (then
Chief Judge) Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit, however, appeared to have
adopted this approach, sub silentio, in his dissent to American Society of
Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal (ASTA). 122
In ASTA, a group of travel agents alleged that the failure to tax the
American Jewish Congress (AJC), a tax exempt organization, 23 on in-
116. 551 F.2d at 328.
117. Id. at 329.
118. Other courts have done the same to avoid the causal nexus inquiry between the agency
ruling and the actions of the regulated entity. See, e.g., Safir v. Kreps, 551 F.2d 447, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (injury to competitive interest); National Ass'n of Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v.
Mathews, 551 F.2d 321, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (reduced opportunity for funding); Ellis v. HUD, 551
F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir. 1977) (rent increased without opportunity to be heard); Alabama Nursing
Home Ass'n v. Califano, 433 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (M.D. Ala. 1977) (injury to right to have pay-
ments made on cost-related basis); AMA v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(impediment to professional judgment).
119. 551 F.2d at 328.
120. Id. at 329.
121. See id. at 328 n.44.
122. 566 F.2d 145, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
123. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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come derived from the operation of travel programs124 caused competi-
tive injury. Plaintiffs contended that exempting such unrelated
business income from taxation enabled the AJC to charge lower prices
than private travel agents, thereby placing plaintiffs at a competitive
disadvantage. 125 Thus plaintiffs argued that the IRS's improper admin-
istration of the Code caused their competitive injury.1 26
The D.C. Circuit applied the Eastern Kentucky reasoning' 27 and con-
cluded that it was purely speculative whether one who patronized the
AJC would be likely to do business with plaintiffs if the IRS enforced
the Code in the manner plaintiffs sought. 28  The court construed
plaintiffs' injury as the loss of business or profits. 29  Because its cus-
tomers might continue to patronize the AJC even if the cost of its serv-
ices remained higher, the court denied plaintiffs' standing.1 30
Judge Bazelon avoided the Eastern Kentucky holding and its causal
nexus inquiry by defining injury broadly as the systematic distortion of
the marketplace. 31 Plaintiffs, the intended beneficiaries of the Code
provisions designed to "protect competitors of tax-exempt organiza-
tions," 132 were injured by illegal IRS rulings which did not foster the
competitive atmosphere 33 Congress intended to create between tax ex-
empt organizations and their competitors.
Exercise of the court's remedial powers would necessarily increase
the costs of the AJC, eliminate the unfair competitive advantage, and
create the competitive environment Congress intended. 134  Thus re-
gardless of whether customers of the AJC would do business with
124. Id. § 511 imposes on corporations subject to id. § 501(c)(3) a tax on "unrelated business
taxable income."
125. 566 F.2d at 148.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 149.
128. Id. at 149-50.
129. Id. at 150.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 159 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 150 n.4. Although Judge Bazelon does not explicitly refer to plaintiffs' status
under the statute, it is implicit in his sub silentio adoption of Justice Brennan's Eastern Kentucky
dissent. Judge Bazelon said:
Appellants allege a competitive injury, stemming from a systematic distortion of the
market place. They claim that, because of illegal IRS rulings, their competitors pay no
taxes and therefore have lower costs and charge lower prices. There is nothing hypo-
thetical about this allegation: If we grant the relief appellants seek, the costs of their
competitors would necessarily increase.
Id. at 159 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
133. Id. at 149.
134. See id. at 159 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
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plaintiffs if the IRS taxed the alleged "unrelated business income,"
plaintiffs' injury would be effectively redressed by the government's en-
couragement of fair competition between tax exempt organizations and
their competitors.
By defining injury as the government's encouragement of a violation
of constitutional rights or statutory rights and benefits, the courts avoid
the rigorous demonstration of a causal nexus between the asserted ille-
gal agency action and actions of the regulated entity. Where plaintiffs'
injury is defined as the loss of a right or benefit caused by the actions of
the regulated entity, however, Eastern Kentucky still mandates an in-
quiry into the causal nexus between the agency ruling and the actions
of the regulated entity.'35 In these cases, some courts have chosen an
alternative route around Eastern Kentucky by simply requiring a less
stringent demonstration of the causal link. 36
In his dissent to AST4, Judge Bazelon argued that even if plaintiffs'
ultimate injury is defined as the loss of business or profits, plaintiffs
satisfied the causal nexus inquiry and should therefore be granted
standing.'37 He contended that because causation is a vague concept,
the causal link between the IRS ruling and the AJC's customers' re-
sponse to that ruling is established implicitly by routine economic
analysis. 138
Other courts have also found causation to be a malleable concept
and have avoided Eastern Kentucky by requiring a less stringent dem-
135. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
136. See, eg., Rental Hous. Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1977);
Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 432 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Fair Hous. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976);
National Land for People, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 417 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1976).
137. 566 F.2d at 159 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
138. Id. at 159 n.41 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting). The Supreme Court, as well, recognizes that
causation is a malleable standard. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978), plaintiffs challenged the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976),
which imposes a limitation on liability for nuclear accidents. The defendants contended that the
power plants would have been constructed, resulting in plaintiffs' alleged injuries, even if. Price-
Anderson had not been passed. The Court granted plaintiffs' standing and held that the private
power companies' "participation would not have occurred but for the enactment and implementa-
tion of the Price-Anderson Act." Id. at 2633.
Although the Court found a "but for" relationship between the alleged unlawful act and the
injury, it held that "fn]othing in our prior cases requires a party seeking to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion to negate the kind of speculative and hypothetical possibilities suggested in order to demon-
strate the likely effectiveness ofjudicial relief." Id. Where along the continuum of causation the
Court will draw the line must therefore depend upon the particular facts of each case. See 566
F.2d at 159 n.41 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting) (causation and redressability are "the kind of stand-
ards that acquire meaningful content only in application to particular circumstances").
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STANDING FOR TAX LITIGANTS
onstration of the nexus between the agency ruling and the actions of
the regulated entity.139 Although Judge Bazelon was willing to accept a
lesser demonstration of causation in tax cases, it is unlikely that most
courts will bend the causation determination in favor of public and
quasi-public interest tax litigants because of their reluctance to inter-
fere with tax collection. 14°
Although Eastern Kentucky appeared to foreclose all suits by liti-
gants challenging revenue rulings that do not affect their own tax liabil-
ity,14 1 closer analysis indicates that at least some public and quasi-
public interest tax litigants may, by very careful pleading, establish
their standing to sue. Eastern Kentucky should not affect plaintiffs
who can establish injury caused by the implementation of an agency
ruling that encourages the violation of constitutional rights 42 or con-
gressionally conferred rights and benefits.' 43  But where the court in-
terprets plaintiffs' injury as the loss of a right or benefit resulting from
the actions of the entity whose tax liability is at stake, standing depends
upon the likelihood that the relief sought will affect that entity's con-
duct in a manner favorable to plaintiffs. 1" Because likelihood is a
malleable standard,1 45 the degree of probability at which a federal
court will exercise jurisdiction will fluctuate with the circumstances of
the particular case."4 Public and quasi-public interest tax litigants,
however, must demonstrate a high degree of probability to overcome
the courts' traditional reluctance to interfere with tax collection.14
7
139. See cases cited in note 136 supra.
140. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. For this same reason, it is unlikely that lower
federal courts will adopt the Supreme Court's method of avoiding Eastern Kentucky, Le., by sim-
ply failing to apply it. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,62 (1976); Davis, Stand-
ing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 69, 74-77 (1977).
One commentator, however, has noted that where a suit seeks to void a ruling that would result
in increased tax revenues, the governmental interest in noninterference with tax collection sub-
stantially diminishes. Note, supra note 6, at 1264; cf American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 153 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting) (I.R.C. § 7421(a),
the Anti-Injunction Act, "only forbids suits instigated 'for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax,'. . . it does not bar suits seeking to compel the collection of taxes").
141. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 105-08 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 93-104 supra and accompanying text.
144. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
145. See 566 F.2d at 159 nAl (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
146. See note 138 supra.
147. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
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Thus the first approach, which at least some courts have accepted sub
silentio in nontax cases, is the better way to avoid Eastern Kentucky.
As a matter of litigation strategy, therefore, public and quasi-public
interest tax litigants should allege an injury to a constitutionally pro-
tected right or a congressionally conferred right or benefit. Confronted
with this approach to standing, which is consistent with Article III re-
quirements, courts may seize the opportunity to open their doors to
litigants who seek to ensure that the Secretary of the Treasury's inter-
pretation of the Code is consonant with declared public policy.148
Eric L. Goldberg
148. See note 21 su.pra and accompanying text.
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